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A.

BRUNOBUILT'S CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS
1.

The Court Cannot "Affirm" A Finding That Does Not Exist

Strata asks the Court to "affirm the district court's finding that the claims are barred by the
applicable statute of limitations." Respondent's Brief, p. 1. In fact, there is no such finding to
"affirm." While it is true that the district court initially concluded that BrunoBuilt's lawsuit was
untimely, R. 334-341, the court upon reconsideration expressly and unambiguously withdrew that
finding:
The Court's grant of summary judgment to the Strata Defendants on the timeliness
defense was unnecessary given its rulings on the motion to enforce settlement
agreement and the economic loss theory. As such, the Court withdraws its findings
on the timeliness defense, thereby rendering BrunoBuilt' s motion to reconsider
moot on this issue, as well as the Strata Defendants' motion to strike.
R. 770-771 (emphasis added). Thus, there is no finding to "affirm" with regard to Strata's statute

of limitations defense.

2.

The Period Of Repose Did Not Commence Until The Subdivision Was
Completed In 2014

Strata asserts that it finished its work on the Nativa Terra Subdivision No. 4 "on or around
February 5, 2008." Respondent's Brief, p. 28. Based on that assertion, Strata calculates that any
claims arising from its negligence accrued six years later - on February 5, 2014 - pursuant to the
statute ofrepose set forth in I.C. § 5-241(a) ("Statute of Repose"), which provides as follows:
5-241. ACCRUAL OF ACTIONS ARISING OUT OF THE DESIGN OR
CONSTRUCTION OF IMPROVEMENT TO REAL PROPERTY. Actions will be
deemed to have accrued and the statute oflimitations shall begin to run as to actions
against any person by reason of his having performed or furnished the design,
planning, supervision or construction of an improvement to real property, as
follows:

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - Page 1
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(a) Tort actions, if not previously accrued, shall accrue and the applicable
limitation statute shall begin to run six (6) years after the final completion
of construction of such an improvement.
Id. Strata further asserts that claims arising out of its negligence are subject to the two-year statute
of limitations set forth in I.C. § 5-219(4):
5-219. ACTIONS AGAINST OFFICERS, FOR PENALTIES, ON BONDS, AND
FOR
PROFESSIONAL
MALPRACTICE
OR
FOR
PERSONAL
INJURIES. Within two (2) years:
***
4. An action to recover damages for professional malpractice, or for an
injury to the person, or for the death of one caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of another, including any such action arising from breach of an
implied warranty or implied covenant…. The term “professional
malpractice” as used herein refers to wrongful acts or omissions in the
performance of professional services by any person, firm, association, entity
or corporation licensed to perform such services under the law of the state
of Idaho. This subsection shall not affect the application of section 5-243,
Idaho Code, except as to actions arising from professional malpractice.
Neither shall this subsection be deemed or construed to amend, or repeal
section 5-241, Idaho Code.
Id. Thus, according to Strata, the applicable limitations period expired on February 5, 2016, around
the time the landslide first manifested on North Alto Via Court. Id.; R. 1556, ¶ 7. BrunoBuilt
acknowledges that Strata has correctly cited the applicable statutes, but Strata’s application of the
statutes to the facts of the present case is incorrect.
a.

Strata’s Geotechnical Engineering Is Not An “Improvement To Real
Property”

The Statute of Repose applies to a person who has “performed or furnished the design,
planning, supervision or construction of an improvement to real property[.]” I.C. § 5-241
(emphasis added). “An improvement is something that enhances or augments the value or quality
of the real property.’” Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling, 153 Idaho 735, 739, 291 P.3d 418, 422

____________________________________________________________________________________
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF – Page 2
I:\10822.003\PLD\Appeal\Drafts\2019.09.10-Appellant's Reply Brief-Final.docx

(2012). A cause of action is deemed to accrue no more than six years after “final completion of
construction of such an improvement.” I.C. § 5-241(a) (emphasis added).
Here, Strata was retained to provide geotechnical engineering and oversight work in
connection with development of the Terra Nativa subdivision. R. 126, ¶ 3. Strata’s responsibilities
included “monitoring and identifying any geologic or geotechnical issues present during mass
grading and other earth moving operations.” R. 980, ¶ 10. Such activities are not something that is
“constructed” or that enhances or augments the value of the property. On the contrary, geotechnical
assessments are professional services that contribute to the planning or design of an improvement
that is to be constructed. Strata’s geotechnical engineering, in and of itself, was not an
“improvement” to real property.
b.

The Construction Of The Terra Nativa Subdivision Was The
“Improvement To Real Property”

As explained below, the Terra Nativa Subdivision was an interconnected and
interdependent development in which approvals and permits required compliance with prior
approvals and permits. Strata itself recognized this to be the case on numerous occasions.
Moreover, Strata continued to be involved in the continuous development of the project as its
geotechnical engineering services were relied upon in the construction of each lot in the
Subdivision.
i.

Phases Of The Terra Nativa Subdivision Are Interconnected, And
Marketing And Development Of Each Individual Lot Was Part Of
The Project

Strata prepared a document entitled “Report – Preliminary Soil & Geologic Evaluation”
and dated September 29, 1992 (“1992 Report”). R. 424-453. The 1992 Report was prepared for a
proposed development that would ultimately become the Terra Nativa Subdivision. Id. The 1992
____________________________________________________________________________________
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Report states multiple times that further development would require site-specific evaluations. R.
436,439, 442. The 1992 Report concluded with a section entitled "Further Evaluation":
This preliminary soils and geologic evaluation was prepared to help provide
preliminary information for planning and development of the property. The
information is not a substitute for site-specific geological and soils engineering
evaluations required for final design. Additional evaluation should include
subsurface soil exploration by drilling and backhoe test pits for soil sampling and
laboratory testing, detailed geologic mapping, ground water and drainage studies.
Slope stability studies should be carried out in areas where the Boise Foothills
volcanic assemblage has been identified. Additional studies should be carried out
in areas containing a high clay content. These studies should be presented in a final
soil and engineering report. Individual lot owners should be made aware of
possible existing site conditions, and all engineering reports giving specific
recommendations and opinions.
R. 446-44 7 (emphasis added). 1
On December 31, 1997, Strata submitted to the developers ("TN LLP") a "proposal for a
geotechnical engineering evaluation related to the infrastructure improvements for the proposed
Peregrine Springs residential development," later renamed Terra Nativa. R. 454-462, 465. Strata
proposed to "perform individual geotechnical evaluations for each lot within the development. ... "
R. 457 (emphasis added). Strata further "recommend[ed] Strata be retained to provide observation

testing, and consultation during the construction phase to verify our design assumptions and
provide quality control for the infrastructure improvement portion of this project." Id.

1

BrunoBuilt recognizes that the 1992 Report is signed by Defendant H. Robert Howard on behalf
of Howard Consulting, Inc. Strata, however, consistently refers to the 1992 Report as its own
report. See, e.g., R. 454 ("We previously prepared a preliminary soils and geologic evaluation for
the project, dated September 29, 1992") (emphasis added).
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Shortly thereafter, Strata issued a “Report – Geologic and Soil Engineering Evaluation”
dated February 20, 1998 (“1998 Report”) that “supplements and extends” the 1992 Report. R. 463536. The geographic area of the 1998 Report was the entire Terra Nativa Subdivision:
The subject property covers 102 acres, total. We understand this land is to be
subdivided into lots for single-family residences. A total of 70 lots are planned,
with 44 lots to be subdivided during the first phase … of development which will
cover the western portions of the site. The remainder of the site will be planned at
a later time and is expected to be coordinated with the Phase I development.
R. 468. Notably, the map of the test pits dug for the 1998 Report contains an outline of what was
considered “Phase 1” of the project and shows that test pits were dug throughout the entire Terra
Nativa Subdivision, not just the area mapped as Phase 1. R. 502. In recognition of the
interrelatedness of the project, the 1998 Report acknowledged that further evaluations of individual
lots must be conducted:
[I]t is essential for Strata to continue to perform evaluations of the individual lots
as development is planned for them. This process will improve over-all project
continuity and will provide the experience and knowledge developed from
construction of the project to be used for planning design and construction of each
lot.
R. 498. The 1998 Report further acknowledged that the Terra Nativa Subdivision was a single
project to be completed in various phases:
Based on our experience and knowledge of the project and the site conditions,
maintaining Strata’s services as geotechnical consultant during the planning,
design, and construction phases of the project will provide consistency of services
without loss of continuity or contradictions arising from misunderstanding of
earlier phases of work.
R. 499.

____________________________________________________________________________________
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Strata’s “Supplement to Geologic and Soil Engineering Evaluation” dated August 20, 1998
(“1998 Supplement”), R. 537-540, again recognized the continuous and interrelated nature of the
project by stating that additional lot-specific geotechnical evaluations would be necessary:
Strata, Inc. has served as the geotechnical consultant for the Nativa Terra
project, and expects to continue to provide the geotechnical services, evaluations,
and recommendations that will be required for the individual lots at the site. Any
other consultant who becomes involved in geotechnical aspects of design or
construction must notify the owner, Boise City agencies, and Strata, Inc. of their
role. Notification should indicate that they will be providing geotechnical
recommendations and will assume all responsibility as the geotechnical consultant
of record for their portion of the project. Should another consultant be used, the
developer and consultant will hold harmless and indemnify Strata, Inc. from any
geotechnical-related errors or omissions that may arise during or subsequent to their
work.
R. 540 (emphasis added).
In November 1998, Strata and TN LLP addressed Strata’s continued involvement in the
development of the Terra Nativa Subdivision. R. 541-545. Strata expressed its desire to “further
discuss relevant administration, procedural and contractual topics regarding our involvement in
the project as each lot is marketed and developed.” R. 544 (emphasis added). Strata noted that
“[w]e have recommended, as has been verbally agreed, that Strata perform individual geotechnical
evaluations for each lot within the development….” Id.
Over the next year, Strata acknowledged on multiple occasions that the “project” was the
entire Terra Nativa Subdivision and expressed its understanding that this single project would be
completed in various phases. See, R. 546 (“test trenches were advanced … within the first phase
of the project”); R. 553 (“so that we can proceed with final recommendations for this portion of
the project”); R. 554 (“The final design recommendations for the lower portion of the Nativa Terra

____________________________________________________________________________________
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project were presented"); and R. 557 ("as Phase 1 of this project are [sic] completed"). During this
time, Strata proposed language for use in the Terra Nativa Subdivision By-Laws. R. 559-562.
Strata's involvement continued into Phase II of the subdivision, sometimes referred to as
Subdivision No. 2, with issuance of its "Letter Report - Geotechnical Engineering Assessment for
Phase II" dated January 29, 2001 ("2001 Letter Report"). R. 563. To prepare the 2001 Letter
Report, Strata reviewed the 1998 Report. Id. Throughout 2002, Strata provided various services
and issued reports related to Phase II that referenced and relied upon the work performed in
connection with Phase I and specifically the 1998 Report. R. 566-571. Strata described itself as
"the geotechnical engineer of record for the Terra Nativa Subdivision." R. 566.
Strata submitted to TN LLP a "Confirming Proposal - Final Geotechnical Engineering
Evaluation" for Subdivision No. 3 dated September 24, 2003. R. 572-573. This proposal was
based, in part, on the 1998 Report and "the subdivision project file." R. 572. Strata again
recognized the continuous and interrelated nature of the project. The proposal indicates that Strata
would "prepare a report which will address those issues in our January, [sic] 29, 2001 report" the 2001 Letter Report issued for Phase II. Id. The proposal concluded by stating:
This current work is a continuation of our work for the Nativa Terra Subdivision
and as such the general conditions that were signed for the original investigation
are applicable for this work, but we request your acknowledgment authorizing this
Subdivision No. 3 work.
R. 573 (emphasis added).

Strata next issued a "Report- Geotechnical Engineering Evaluation" for Subdivision No.
3 on November 13, 2003 ("2003 Report"). R. 1002-1035. The 2003 Report expressly states that,
"[t]o perform the current evaluation, we have utilized our [1998 Report]. Additionally, we have

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - Page 7
1:\10822.003\PLD\Appeal\Drafts\2019.09.10-Appellant's Reply Brief-Final.docx

referenced engineering evaluation and testing records created during construction of the
subdivision.” R. 1008. Strata prepared a “Response – 3rd Party Review of Geotechnical
Engineering Evaluation Report” in connection with Subdivision No. 3, dated March 4, 2004.
(“2004 Response”). R. 574-605. In the 2004 Response, Strata expressed its understanding that the
Terra Nativa Subdivision is a single project consisting of multiple, interrelated phases:
We consider the City’s review an important part of permitting this project and at
the same time urge the City to remember Subdivision No. 3 is a part of the Nativa
Terra Subdivision development, which includes the existing Subdivisions No. 1
and 2. The engineering and construction database for Subdivisions No. 1 and 2
supplemented the field and laboratory data for Subdivision No. 3 to perform our
geotechnical assessment and interpretation of the subdivision. Also, we
considered the performance history and our experience with the soil and rock types
comprising these subdivisions. In our opinion, these resources were very important
to assessing the physical and engineering properties of the soil and rock
encountered and the long-term performance of the proposed subdivision.
R. 575 (emphasis added). In 2005, Strata conducted individual lot evaluations for several lots
within Subdivision No. 3. R. 606.
Strata’s involvement in Phase 4 of the Terra Nativa Subdivision development commenced
with a “Confirming Proposal – Construction Observation and Testing” dated January 2, 2007. R.
607-608. This proposal again acknowledged that the Terra Nativa Subdivision is a single project
that had been developed and would continue to be developed in continuous and interrelated phases.
Id. On April 28, 2007, TN LLP submitted an application for the final plat of Subdivision No. 4. R.
648-651. This application advised that the drainage system to be used in Subdivision No. 4 was a
“system designed and approved in phases 1 + 2.” R. 651. Later that year, Strata again confirmed
its understanding that its services were part of a multiphase development in its “Revised Proposal
– Geotechnical Services,” dated September 18, 2007, in which Strata stated that it “appreciate[d]

____________________________________________________________________________________
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the opportunity to continue our working relationship with you. We remain committed to the
successful accomplishment of this project.” R. 609-610.
As anticipated and requested, Strata remained involved in the development of the Terra
Nativa Subdivision by conducting individual lot evaluations from 2009 to 2014. R. 617-647. These
individual lot evaluations included Lot 23, Block 6, Nativa Terra No. 4 Boise, Idaho – a lot across
the street from the lot at issue in this case. R. 629-633. This report – dated June 11, 2012 – was
addressed to BrunoBuilt. Id.
ii.

“Final Completion” Of The Subdivision Did Not Occur Until The
Final Plat For Phase 9 Was Recorded In March 2014

Final plats for Terra Nativa Subdivision Nos. 4 through 9 were recorded between August
26, 2008 and March 20, 2014. R. 361-423. Conditions of Approval for each of these “subdivisions”
required development in accordance with the designs and conditions of approval issued for Terra
Nativa Subdivision No. 2 as set forth in CFH01-00005, CUP02-00032 and CFH03-00031. R. 365,
376, 386, 395, 405, and 415. Likewise, per the Conditions of Approval, each phase of the
subdivision was to conform with “all requirements” of the Boise Hillside and Foothills ordinance.
R. 366, 377, 386, 395, 405, and 415. And each Condition of Approval contained a deadline for
submission of the subsequent phase’s final plat. R. 365, 376, 386, 395, and 405.
The interrelatedness of the various phases of the Terra Nativa Subdivision is dramatically
demonstrated by the fact that the work performed and approved in Subdivision No. 9 significantly
contributed to reactivation of the landslide that damaged the subject dwelling. Civil and
Geotechnical Engineer and Geophysicist Patrick O. Shires concluded that “[c]utting of the
driveway from North Strata Via Way to the central ‘executive’ lot of the subdivision [No. 9] below

____________________________________________________________________________________
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the homes on North Alto Via Court created a partial reactivation of the old landslide whereby it
produced toe failure features in the driveway to this lot." R. 1488, ,r 8.2. See also, R. 1455-1456,

,r,r 25-34; R.

1474-1475. These cuts were made during the construction of Subdivision No. 9. R.

413, 681-686.

c.

BrunoBuilt' s Claims Were Timely Filed

Based on the foregoing, the "improvement to real property" in this matter was the Terra
Nativa Subdivision, which did not reach final completion until March 2014 when the last plat was
recorded. The first signs of damage to BrunoBuilt' s property occurred in approximately April
2016, well within the six-year period of repose set forth in I.C. § 5-241(a). And BrunoBuilt
commenced this action in September 2017, well within the two-year statute oflimitations set forth
in I.C. § 5-219(4). Accordingly, BrunoBuilt's claims were timely filed, and the district court erred
in finding otherwise.

B.

NO ENFORCEABLE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS EVER ACHIEVED
1.

BrunoBuilt And Strata Never Reached A Settlement Agreement

Strata asserts that "[o]n January 10, 2018, Strata's counsel and Mr. Johnson [i.e.,
Bruno Built' s former counsel] had a telephone call, in which Mr. Johnson conveyed Bruno Built' s
agreement to release its claims against Strata in exchange a [sic] covenant not to sue by the
Rowans." Respondent's Brief, p. 5. BrunoBuilt disputes that any such agreement occurred, as at
least three material terms remained unresolved at that point: ( 1) whether to include a Pierringer
provision in the settlement agreement; (2) whether the covenant not to sue demanded by
BrunoBuilt would expressly identify BrunoBuilt as an intended third-party beneficiary; and (3)
whether the executed covenant not to sue would be provided to BrunoBuilt. R. 174-176;
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Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 9. Indeed, Strata acknowledges that "[t]he parties continued to

negotiate the terms of BrunoBuilt's settlement between January 10, 2017, and February 9,
2017 .. .. " Respondent's Brief, p. 6 (emphasis added). No settlement agreement was achieved on
January 10, 2018. 2
The parties agree that Strata's counsel sent a proposed release agreement to Johnson on
February 9, 2017, and that attorney Johnson objected to the terms of the proposed agreement. Id.;
R. 176-177. Specifically, the proposed agreement was not a mutual release, included
confidentiality provisions that the parties had never agreed to, and did not expressly identify
BrunoBuilt as a third-party beneficiary of the covenant not to sue to be executed by the Rowans.
R. 92, 17 6-177. 3 Strata acknowledges that attorney Johnson insisted upon "mutual release

language," Respondent's Brief, p. 6, but neglects to mention that Strata's counsel refused to
include such language. R. 178, ,r 3(u). Thus, no settlement agreement had been reached as ofMarch
14,2017.
Strata's counsel sent another proposed agreement to attorney Johnson on May 10, 2017. R.
93-106. On June 9, 2017, Strata's counsel followed up with an e-mail to Johnson asking "Has your
client agreed to sign?" R. 107. The answer was not "yes." Instead, Johnson cryptically and
ambiguously responded "I'm just trying to get him chased down for signature." Id. This statement
does not establish, as Strata suggests, that Bruno had agreed to a settlement, only that Johnson was

2

The district court determined that a settlement agreement was achieved on January 9, 2018, a
position not taken by Strata. R. 329-330, 764-765.
3

Unbeknownst to BrunoBuilt, the Rowans apparently had already executed a confidential
covenant not to sue on January 12, 2017. R. 52, 178. Moreover, a copy of this confidential
agreement has still not been provided to Bruno Built as of the date of this filing.
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trying to obtain Bruno's consent to the proposed settlement agreement and signature. R. 178, ,r x.
In other words, when viewed in a light most favorable to BrunoBuilt, there remains - at the very
least - a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the parties ever reached a settlement
agreement.
2.

Seward And Kosmann Are Readily Distinguishable - In Each Case, Not Only
Was A Settlement Agreement Reached, But Its Terms Were Read Into The
Record

Purportedly in support of their assertion that the parties entered into an enforceable
settlement agreement, Strata cites Seward v. Musick Auction, LLC, 164 Idaho 149, 426 P.3d 1249
(2018), andKosmann v. Dinius, Docket No. 45779, 2019 WL 2098775 (Idaho May 14, 2019). But
Seward and Kosmann are readily distinguishable from the present case in several material respects.

In Seward, the parties unquestionably reached a settlement agreement at a court-ordered
mediation presided over by Judge Stephen Dunn. Judge Dunn read the terms of the parties'
agreement into the record but fell victim to a technical error:
Following the mediation, Judge Dunn went into court with the parties and read the
terms of the parties' agreement into the record. No court reporter was present.
Because of a technical error - the audio was muted - the proceedings were not
successfully recorded. Thus, the court minutes represent the only record of the
proceedings. The minutes state, in pertinent part:
The Court noted the parties had reached a settlement agreement and stated
the terms and conditions of the agreement for the record.
In answer to the Courts [sic] inquiry, each of the parties and their counsel
concurred with the settlement agreement as set forth on the record by the
Court.
The Court noted the settlement agreement entered into resolved the case and
it would notify the assigned Judge of the same.
The Court directed [Musick' s counsel] Mr. Webb to submit necessary
documents to dismiss the case, including a release.
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Seward at 151-152, 426 P.3d at 1251-1252. In the cited case, there was no dispute that the parties
had achieved a settlement agreement. They and their attorneys acknowledged as much on the
record, the “terms and conditions” of the settlement agreement were read into the record, and Judge
Dunn expressly noted on the record that the settlement agreement resolved the case.
Subsequently, however, Musick insisted upon adding substantive terms and conditions to
the existing settlement agreement – specifically, “a confidentiality clause, a stipulation that Seward
had been an independent contractor rather than an employee, and a requirement that Seward’s wife
be a party to the agreement.” Id. at 152, 426 P.3d at 1252. Not surprisingly, this Court held that
“[t]he court minutes reflect that the parties reached a final agreement,” Id. at 159, 426 P.3d at 1259,
and that Musick could not substantively alter the terms and conditions of that agreement after the
fact.
Similarly, in Kosmann, the parties reached a tentative agreement, negotiated further, then
put the terms of their agreement on the record:
The parties and their counsel then put the renegotiated settlement agreement on the
record. [Attorney] Messerly noted on the record that Kosmann initially agreed to
settle the matter for $40,000, but that after the private meeting with Dinius, which
Messerly did not consent to, Kosmann agreed to settle for approximately $8,000
less in exchange for the release for Messerly…. After it was apparent that an accord
had been reached, the mediator asked Dinius’s attorney, Dunbar, to “take the lead”
in drafting the stipulation and a proposed order of dismissal.
Kosmann at *4-5. So there was no dispute that a settlement agreement had been reached, but
Messerly subsequently advised Dunbar “that Kosmann had decided to back out of the settlement
agreement.” Id. at *6. Not surprisingly, the district court “enforced the oral settlement agreement
that was put on the record at mediation,” Id., and this Court affirmed.

____________________________________________________________________________________
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Thus, in both Seward and Kosmann the parties reached a settlement agreement at mediation
and put their agreement on the record - or, in Seward, would have put their agreement on the
record but for a "technical error." In Seward one of the parties attempted to subsequently make
material changes to the agreement, and in Kosmann one of the parties tried to back out of the
agreement altogether. In neither case, however, was there a dispute as to whether a settlement
agreement had been achieved in the first place. But that is the issue in the present case. Therefore
Seward and Kosmann are readily distinguishable from the present case, and Strata's reliance on
those cases is misplaced.

3.

BrunoBuilt's Position Is Not Based On "Improper Subjective Beliefs"

Strata asserts that "BrunoBuilt seeks to avoid enforcement of the settlement agreement
almost entirely upon the improper subjective beliefs ofBrunoBuilt's principal, Robert Bruno, and
its former counsel, Wyatt Johnson." Respondent's Brief, p. 17. This assertion is demonstrably
inaccurate. Bruno Built' s statement of facts related to the parties' settlement discussions is just that
- a statement of facts. Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 7-12. There are but two even arguably
substantive references to Johnson's "subjective beliefs":
At least three material terms remained unresolved at that point: ( 1) whether to
include a Pierringer provision; (2) whether the covenant not to sue to be executed
by the Rowans would expressly identify BrunoBuilt as an intended third-party
beneficiary; and (3) whether the executed covenant not to sue would be provided
to BrunoBuilt. Johnson reasonably expected that Scanlan would provide a written
covenant not to sue, but it is now clear that Scanlan had no intention of doing so.
Id., p. 9 (emphasis added).
It is not reasonable to conclude that Johnson agreed to dismiss Kleinfelder in
exchange for a covenant not to sue that would not be provided to BrunoBuilt and
the existence and terms of which BrunoBuilt had no way of proving. Much more
reasonable is Johnson's "intent and understanding that, in consideration for any
promise BrunoBuilt made to release its pending claims against Strata, Strata
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would provide BrunoBuilt with a written covenant not to sue signed by the
Rowans that expressly stated that BrunoBuilt was an intended third-party
beneficiary of the covenant."
Id., pp. 17-18 (emphasis added). 4 The evidence demonstrates that Johnson required a "direct and

independent right to enforce any covenant not to sue," R. 174-175 (emphasis added), and
reasonably expected that attorney Scanlan would provide it. After all, what good is a covenant not
to sue if it is not provided to the party who might be sued?
In this case, however, Scanlan inexplicably inserted the covenant not to sue into a
confidential settlement agreement that he could not provide to BrunoBuilt:

Further, as BrunoBuilt's counsel was well aware, the Sericati release agreement in
which the Rowan covenant is contained is subject to a confidentiality clause,
requiring specific consent from all parties to the release agreement before it could
be disclosed to BrunoBuilt.
Respondent's Brief, p. 19 (emphasis added); R. 737. BrunoBuilt's references to Johnson's
subjective belief are not intended to demonstrate Johnson's belief but the absurdity ofrefusing to
provide BrunoBuilt a copy of an alleged covenant not to sue BrunoBuilt. As the covenant not to
sue was a material term, BrunoBuilt and its counsel undoubtedly had to have the opportunity to
review the specific terms of the covenant not to sue before they could agree to it. Regardless, there
are precisely zero references to Bruno's subjective beliefs in Appellant's Opening Brief.
Strata's argument about "subjective beliefs" is nothing but a straw man propped up by
statements contained in the record that BrunoBuilt did not cite in its opening brief and does not
rely upon.

4

Appellant's Opening Brief makes a third reference to Johnson's declared "intent and
understanding" for the limited purpose of identifying the apparent basis of the district court's
determination that the parties reached a settlement agreement on January 20, 2017. Appellant's
Opening Brief, p. 20.
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4.

Strata Inexplicably Made Sure That BrunoBuilt Could Not Easily Obtain
The Covenant Not To Sue

Strata does not deny that Johnson demanded from Scanlan, on January 9, 2017, a "direct
and independent right to enforce any covenant not to sue that the Rowans might give to Strata in
the Sericati Action." R. 174-175; Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 8. Nor does Strata deny that what
Johnson actually received instead, nearly two months later, was a letter purportedly excerpting the
"relevant language" from the Sericati release. R. 87-91. And Strata acknowledges that BrunoBuilt
could not obtain the actual signed covenant not to sue without the "specific consent from all parties
to the [Sericati] release agreement."
Yet in the next breath, Strata asserts without explanation that "BrunoBuilt' s breach of the
settlement agreement and refusal to execute the release, however, is the only reason it was not
provided with a signed copy of the Rowan covenant not to sue." Id., p. 20. How so? Strata did not
provide BrunoBuilt with the "confidentiality" provision from the Sericati release and admits that
BrunoBuilt could not have obtained the covenant not to sue without the consent of all parties to
the Sericati release. How could BrunoBuilt' s execution of a settlement agreement in this matter
negate the confidentiality requirement in the Sericati release? Strata does not explain. 5
Secreting the covenant not to sue within a confidential release agreement - to which
BrunoBuilt was not a party and to which BrunoBuilt had no reliable access - could not provide
BrunoBuilt with a "direct and independent right to enforce" the covenant.

5

The district court, similarly without explanation and despite having been advised of the
confidentiality provision in the Sericati release, concluded that BrunoBuilt "could easily obtain
the covenant simply by inquiring with Strata's counsel or requesting that the Rowans provide it in
discovery." R. 737, 766.
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C.

THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE DOES NOT BAR BRUNOBUIL T'S CLAIMS
1.

The Economic Loss Rule Does Not Apply To The Complete Loss Or
Destruction Of Property

Strata correctly states that "[ e ]conomic loss includes costs of repair and replacement of
defective property which is the subject of the transaction, as well as commercial loss for inadequate
value and consequent loss of profits or use." Respondent's Brief, p. 23, quoting Salmon Rivers

Sportsman Camps v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 352, 544 P.2d 306, 310 (1975) (italics
added). But under Idaho law, the economic loss rule does not apply to the complete loss or

destruction of property.
The seminal case in this regard is Oppenheimer Indus. v. Johnson Cattle Co., 112 Idaho
423, 732 P.2d 661 (1986). Oppenheimer contracted with Bolen Cattle Company to care for several
head of cattle owned by Oppenheimer. Bolen allegedly re-branded the cattle and sold them without
Oppenheimer's permission. Oppenheimer sued the State Brand Board on the theory that the
Board's failure to require proof of ownership of the cattle constituted actionable negligence. The
district court held that Oppenheimer's loss of its cattle was essentially an economic loss that was
unrecoverable in a negligence action. This Court reversed that holding:
Oppenheimer is not alleging mere economic damage. Unlike the plaintiff in Clark
[v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326,581 P.2d 784 (1978)], Oppenheimer
is not still in possession of defective goods. Rather, Oppenheimer has suffered
the loss of its property (i.e. the cattle) due to the negligence of the deputy brand
inspector.

***
It is also black-letter law that a cause of action in negligence is available for one
whose chattel is lost or destroyed through the negligence of another.... Thus,
whether the actions of the deputy brand inspector were intentional or negligent,
Oppenheimer has a cause of action in tort.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - Page 17
1:\10822.003\PLD\Appeal\Drafts\2019.09.10-Appellant's Reply Brief-Final.docx

Oppenheimer at 426, 732 P.2d at 664 (italics in original; boldface added); Appellant's Opening

Brief, p. 28. Thus, the Oppenheimer court drew a distinction between the cost of repairing or
replacing defective property (which is subject to the economic loss rule) and costs associated with
the loss or destruction of property (which are not subject to the economic loss rule).
The Court reiterated that distinction in Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass 'n, 126 Idaho
1002, 1007, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200 n.5 (1995), noting that in Oppenheimer "'property loss' was
equated with a loss of physical possession of one's property, even

if that property was the subject

of the transaction" (emphasis added). Similarly, in O Bar Cattle Co. v. Owyhee Feeders, Inc., No.

CV08-149-S-EJL-CWD, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 64958, *8-9 (D. Idaho June 30, 2010), the court
observed that "[t]he court in Oppenheimer drew a distinction between property that had been
reduced in value and property that had been destroyed."
That same distinction applies here. The evidence shows that the landslide destroyed
BrunoBuilt's property. Specifically, Civil and Geotechnical Engineer and Geophysicist Patrick
Shires determined that the dwelling should be razed and the lot should be abandoned:
Because of the depth of the active landslide and location of the active fault,
attempting to pin the house in place and stabilize the structure from ongoing and
future movement would be prohibitively costly and in my opinion the house
should be removed from the lot and the lot abandoned as the other adjacent
damaged houses and lots were.
R. 666, ,r 27 (emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to Oppenheimer, BrunoBuilt did not sustain "mere

economic damage." On the contrary, BrunoBuilt suffered the complete loss of its property due to
Strata's negligence. Under Idaho law, the economic loss rule does not apply under these
circumstances.
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2.

Strata's "Temporal Distinction" Argument Militates Against Application Of
The Economic Loss Rule

Strata asserts that the Court in Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Sys., 147 Idaho 785, 215 P.3d 505
(2009), found "that the plaintiff was not damaged by the purchase of cows, but by the purchase,
installation, and operation of the milking machine." Respondent's Brief, p. 25. There is no mention
in Aardema of purchasing cows. There was only one transaction at issue in Aardema, and that was
Aardema's contract with the defendants for the installation and maintenance of an automated
milking system. So there was no "temporal distinction," as Strata asserts, nor could there be with
only one transaction having occurred.
Similarly, Strata asserts that the Court in Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Elec., Inc.,
150 Idaho 22,244 P.3d 166 (2010), found "that the purchase of the restaurant destroyed by fire
was not the source of damage caused by a subsequent contract for services, which were negligently
rendered." Id. Brian & Christie's purchase of the restaurant was never mentioned, and there was
no consideration that the purchase of the restaurant might be the "transaction" at issue. As in
Aardema, there was no "temporal distinction" to be made in Brian & Christie.

A better example of a "temporal distinction" occurred in Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho
37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987), where Tusch purchased three existing duplexes. When Tusch
subsequently learned that the duplexes had been partially constructed on fill dirt that had
compacted, causing damage to the duplexes and the parking lot, it sued the seller and the builder.
This Court held that the economic loss rule barred Tusch's claims because Tusch "has suffered no
personal injuries and has suffered no damage to property other than that which was the subject of
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the duplex sales transaction.” Id. at 40, 740 P.2d at 1025. There was no further discussion in Tusch
as to the “subject of the transaction.”
The Court revisited Tusch in Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 197, 983 P.2d 848, 851
(1999), specifically as to the “subject of the transaction”:
In Tusch, the defendant builder entered into a contract to build a duplex for the
seller. The purchaser sued both the seller and the builder because of alleged
negligence in preparing the foundation. This Court held that damage to the duplex
caused by the defective foundation was purely economic. Once again, the subject
of the transaction was not specifically discussed by this Court. It is nonetheless
clear that the Court considered the duplex itself, rather than its construction, to
be the subject of the transaction. [Emphasis added.]
In other words, the Court concluded that the existing duplexes purchased by Tusch were the
“subject of the transaction.” Their construction was a separate, prior event. The Court essentially
recognized the “temporal distinction” between the duplexes and their construction.
The present case is the mirror image of Tusch. Here, the subject of the transaction was a
vacant lot conveyed to BrunoBuilt for the purpose of constructing a dwelling, upon completion of
which BrunoBuilt would convey the property to William and Ann Dempsey in a subsequent
transaction. R. 19, ¶¶ 1, 2; R. 963; R. 1555, ¶¶ 4-5. The dwelling did not exist when BrunoBuilt
acquired the vacant lot. The contemplated construction of the dwelling and its conveyance to the
Dempseys were separate, subsequent events – that is, there is a “temporal distinction” between
and among the conveyance of the vacant lot, the construction of the dwelling, and its conveyance
to the Dempseys. It is clear that these are separate transactions because the final anticipated
transaction – conveyance of the completed dwelling to the Dempseys – never occurred.
Accordingly, the destruction of the dwelling constitutes “damage to property other than that which
is the subject of the transaction” and the economic loss rule does not apply.

____________________________________________________________________________________
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3.

Strata's - And The District Court's - Reliance On Blahd Is Misplaced

In Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296,108 P.3d 996 (2005), as in Tusch, the
plaintiffs purchased an existing residential property. This Court held that where a house and lot
are purchased as an "integrated whole," both are the "subject of the transaction":
The Blahds purchased the house and lot as an integrated whole. Like the leveled lot
and duplex in Tusch Enterprises, the subject of the transaction in this case is both
the lot and the house. That being the case, the damages to the Blahds' house are
purely economic and the Blahds' negligence claims against the Smith Entities and
Jones are barred by the economic loss rule.

Id. at 301, 108 P.3d at 1001. It does not follow, however, that a vacant lot and a not-yet-existing
dwelling constitute an "integrated whole."
A much more analogous situation occurred in Buchanan v. Scottsdale Envtl. Constr. &

Dev. Co., 787 P.2d 1081 (Ariz. App. 1989). In order to make a lot that it owned suitable for
residential construction, Scottsdale Environmental hired Western Technologies to advise it on how
to put fill on the steeply sloping lot. Scottsdale initially followed Western's advice, and Western
initially supervised the work, but ultimately the job was finished without the supervision of a soils
engineer. The Buchanans purchased the lot and built a house on it, but the land subsequently
settled, causing extensive damage to the house. The Buchanans sued both Scottsdale and Western.
We also believe the facts described above, if proven at trial, would support
negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims against Scottsdale and Western.
Evidence was presented that Scottsdale built a defective lot and sold it for
residential purposes, omitting to mention that it had not followed expert advice
during the construction of the lot. In addition to other expert evidence that Western
fell below the appropriate standard of care for a soils expert, it represented that the
site was suitable for residential construction.

Buchanan at 1083. While the Buchanan decision did not expressly address the economic loss rule,
the same court later made that connection. In Swiergol v. Doucette Co., No. 2 CA-CV 2004-0191,
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2005 Ariz. App. Unpub. Lexis 427 (Ariz. App. Oct. 12, 2005), the Swiergols - like Tusch and the
Blahds - purchased an existing dwelling. The court distinguished the purchase of an existing
dwelling from the purchase of a vacant lot and subsequent construction of a dwelling:

Buchanan is distinguishable from the present case because, there, the lot was
purchased separately from the home and the defendant had only prepared the lot.
As Buchanan implicitly suggests, when the two are acquired separately, a claim
relating to a defect in the soil that causes damage to the structure may be
actionable in tort and not subject to the economic loss rule. Here, however, the
Swiergols bought their home and lot together as an integrated whole.
Swiergol at *6-7 (emphasis added).
The present case is clearly analogous to Buchanan and readily distinguishable from Tusch
and Blahd. Here, Strata "fell below the appropriate standard of care" and "represented that the site
was suitable for residential construction" - just as Western Technologies had done in Buchanan.
BrunoBuilt and subcontractors hired by BrunoBuilt constructed the dwelling. R. 1556, ,r 6. Only
when the dwelling was nearly complete did the landslide occur. R. 1556, ,r,r 7-8. This fact pattern
is substantively no different from the facts in Buchanan. Under such circumstances, the lot and
structure should be considered separate property for purposes of the economic loss rule, and the
economic loss rule does not bar Bruno Built' s claims against Strata.

D.

BRUNOBUIL T'S CLAIMS AGAINST MICHAEL WOODWORTH SHOULD
NOT BE DISMISSED
Strata asserts that "BrunoBuilt has presented no evidence of Mr. Woodworth's

involvement in the geotechnical engineering work at issue in this matter." Respondent's Brief, p.
36. But Strata itself presented evidence of Woodworth's involvement with the subdivision.
Specifically, in one of the proposed release agreements that it provided to attorney Johnson, Strata
acknowledged that Woodworth "provided construction oversight services for the construction of
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the Nativa Terra Subdivision in 2007 and 2008.” R. 79. The plat for Subdivision No. 4 – where
the subject lot is located – was recorded on August 26, 2008. R. 361-372.
Woodworth avers only that he did not work on Subdivision No. 4 between 2006 and 2012,
but he does not mention the other eight phases of the subdivision. R. 123, ¶ 5. That includes
Subdivision No. 9, the development of which contributed to reactivation of the landslide that
damaged the subject dwelling. R. 1488, ¶ 8.2. Woodworth’s disclaimer of responsibility for
Subdivision No. 4 does not, by itself, absolve him of liability, particularly when viewed in a light
most favorable to BrunoBuilt.
Moreover, for purposes of opposing Strata’s motion for summary judgment, BrunoBuilt
sought a continuance under I.R.C.P. 56(d) to conduct discovery. R. 343-344. Specifically,
BrunoBuilt sought discovery regarding “the involvement and extent of culpability Mr. Woodworth
has in the rendition of negligent engineering services Strata and its engineers provided.” Id. The
district court denied BrunoBuilt’s request, but not because it found no merit in the requested
discovery:
Given the Court’s findings on summary judgment, BrunoBuilt’s IRCP 56(d)
motion is rendered moot. Namely, having found the claim barred by the statutes of
limitation and repose and by operation of the economic loss doctrine, there is no
need to explore Woodworth’s involvement in rendering geotechnical engineering
services to Terra Nativa 4.
R. 344. Accordingly, should the Court remand this matter for further proceedings, BrunoBuilt
should at the very least be permitted to conduct discovery regarding, among many other things,
“the involvement and extent of culpability Mr. Woodworth has in the rendition of negligent
engineering services Strata and its engineers provided.”
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E.

STRATA IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
1.

BrunoBuilt's Abandoned Contract Claim Does Not Establish The Existence
Of A Commercial Transaction

Hoping to create the impression that this case involves a "commercial transaction," for
purposes of invoking I.C. § 12-120(3), Strata points out that BrunoBuilt's Complaint included a
claim styled "Breach of Third Party Beneficiary Contract." Respondent's Brief, p. 41; R. 12-13,

,r,r 22-26. The record reflects, however, that BrunoBuilt abandoned its contract claim in May 2018
and consented to summary judgment as to that claim at that time. R. 316, n.1. The contract claim
is not at issue on appeal and does not support Strata's argument that this appeal involves a
commercial transaction. See, Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980, 988, 342 P.3d 907, 915 (2015)
("we limit the Jacobson group's fees for the quantum meruit continuance issue to those incurred
in defending the appeal until February 13, 2014-the date the court allowed Sims to withdraw that
issue").

2.

There Is No Commercial Transaction That Is Integral To BrunoBuilt's
Claim For Professional Negligence

Strata correctly notes that "BrunoBuilt argued [in the district court] that this matter did not
involve a commercial transaction to support an award of attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. § 12120(3) in opposing" - successfully- "Strata's request for attorney's fees." Respondent's Brief, p.
37, n. 7. BrunoBuilt stands by its original position that there is no commercial transaction that is
integral to Bruno Built' s only remaining claim, for professional negligence, nor is a commercial
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transaction the basis upon which BrunoBuilt seeks recovery as to that claim. Accordingly, Strata's
claim for attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) should be denied. 6
The Court has adopted a two-step analysis to determine the propriety of an attorney fee
award under I.C. § 12-120(3):
(1) there must be a commercial transaction that is integral to the claim; and (2) the
commercial transaction must be the basis upon which recovery is sought. The
commercial transaction must be an actual basis of the complaint. The lawsuit and
the causes of action must be based on a commercial transaction, not simply a
situation that can be characterized as a commercial transaction. In other words, the
relevant inquiry is whether the commercial transaction constituted the gravamen of
the lawsuit, and was the basis on which a party is attempting to recover.

Smith v. Smith, 160 Idaho 778, 787, 379 P.3d 1048, 1057 (2016), quoting Garner v. Povey, 151
Idaho 462,469,259 P.3d 608,615 (2011).
"For a party to recover under section 12-120(3), the commercial transaction must be
between the parties to the lawsuit." Clarke v. Latimer, 437 P.3d 1, 8 (Idaho 2018). See also, Bryan

Trucking, Inc. v. Gier, 160 Idaho 422, 426, 374 P.3d 585, 589 (2016) ("There must be a
commercial transaction between the parties for attorney fees to be awarded"), quoting Great Plains

Equip. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 471, 36 P.3d 218, 223 (2001); Miller v. St.
Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 139 Idaho 825, 839, 87 P.3d 934, 948 (2004) ("a transaction

6

Anticipating that Strata would try to recover attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3), as it tried
to do in the district court, BrunoBuilt asked for attorney fees on appeal merely to avoid waiving
the issue. Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 34. The fact that both parties have asked for attorney fees
under I.C. § 12-120(3), however, does not mean that such an award would be appropriate. See,
Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 327, 256 P.3d 730, 735 (2011):
Both parties requested attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3). As explained
in the section above, this was not an action in a "commercial transaction" in which the
prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to that provision. We therefore decline
to award attorney fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-120(3).

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - Page 25
1:\10822.003\PLD\Appeal\Drafts\2019.09.10-Appellant's Reply Brief-Final.docx

cannot exist under the statute unless the parties dealt with each other directly"); Ag Services of
Am., Inc. v. Kechter, 137 Idaho 62, 67, 44 P.3d 1117, 1122 (2002) (no attorney fee award where

"Ag Service and Kechter were not involved in any commercial transaction between themselves,
nor did either of them allege such a transaction in their respective pleadings").
However, "a commercial transaction does not arise in every instance m which a
commercial relationship exists." Tolley v. THI Co., 140 Idaho 253, 262, 92 P.3d 503, 512 (2004).
See also, Ag Services, 137 Idaho at 67, 44 P.3d at 1122 ("The statute does not authorize the
awarding of attorney fees every time a commercial transaction is connected with the case"); Great
Plains, 136 Idaho at 471, 36 P.3d at 223 ("A court is not required to award reasonable attorney

fees every time a commercial transaction is connected with a case") (brackets and citation omitted).
"The test for whether a commercial transaction is involved in a claim is whether the
commercial transaction is the gravamen of the claim." 7 Willie v. Bd. of Trustees, 138 Idaho 131,
136, 59 P.3d 302, 307 (2002). See also, Ervin Constr. Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 704, 874
P.2d 506, 515 (1993) ("The critical test is whether the commercial transaction comprises the
gravamen of the lawsuit; the commercial transaction must be integral to the claim and constitute
the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover"). "To hold otherwise would be to convert
the award of attorney's fees from an exceptional remedy justified only by statutory authority to a
matter ofright in virtually every lawsuit filed." Great Plains, 136 Idaho at 471, 36 P.3d at 223.
Here, Strata identifies the alleged commercial transaction as "an alleged relationship
between BrunoBuilt and Strata based upon Strata's provision of professional services in the

7

"Gravamen" is defined as "the material or significant part of a grievance or complaint." Sims v.
Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980, 985, 342 P.3d 907, 912 (2015).
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construction of the Terra Nativa subdivision," disingenuously citing BrunoBuilt's long-abandoned
contract claim. Respondent's Brief, p. 41. In fact, it is undisputed that BrunoBuilt was not a party
to, or third-party beneficiary of, Strata's contract with the developers of the subdivision.
Moreover, the mere existence of a commercial transaction is not sufficient to justify an
attorney fee award. The commercial transaction must be the gravamen of the claim. With respect
to its "professional negligence" claim, BrunoBuilt alleges as follows:
18.

The Strata Defendants had a duty of care to perform engineering and/or
geotechnical services according to the applicable standard of care for such
services.

19.

Upon information and belief, the Strata Defendants breached the applicable
standard of care by, among other things, (a) failing to identify a pre-existing
landslide on the site of the Terra Nativa Subdivision; (b) failing to
appreciate, recognize and communicate the existence of long-standing
geological studies, research and mapping identifying the hazardous nature
of the slope, soils and ground for development on the site of the Terra Nativa
subdivision; (c) failing to review and consider readily available studies,
publications, and reports that advised of the existence of a landslide,
hazardous slope and soils in the location where the subdivision was
developed; and (d) failing to recommend construction of infrastructure that
would stabilize and prevent further landslides in the location of the Terra
N ativa subdivision.

R. 12. The gravamen of this claim is that Strata had a duty to perform its professional services in
accordance with the applicable standard of care but breached that duty.
While it is true that Strata's services were performed pursuant to a contract - to which
Bruno Built was not a party - the contract is not integral to Bruno Built' s negligence claim and
certainly is not the basis upon which recovery is sought. Negligence, by definition, involves the
breach of a duty imposed by law, not by contract. Accordingly, the gravamen of BrunoBuilt's
negligence claim is not a commercial transaction.
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3.

BrunoBuilt's Appeal Is Not Frivolous, Unreasonable, Or Without
Foundation
a.

BrunoBuilt's Appeal Is Not Plainly Fallacious

Strata also seeks attorney fees pursuant to I.C. §12-121, which provides in pertinent part
as follows:
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing
party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.
"An award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 is not a matter of right to the prevailing
party, but is appropriate only when the court, in its discretion, is left with the abiding belief that
the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation."

McCann v. McCann, 152 Idaho 809,823,275 P.3d 824, 838 (2012). "The sole question is whether
the losing party's position is so plainly fallacious as to be deemed frivolous, unreasonable or
without foundation." Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 92, 803 P.2d
993, 998 (citation omitted).
The mere fact that a court rejects a party's argument does not render that argument
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation:
A misperception of law or of one's interest under the law is not, by itself,
unreasonable conduct. It if were, virtually every case controlled by a question of
law would entail an attorney fee award against the losing party under I.C. §12-121.
Rather, the question must be whether the position adopted by the [party] was not
only incorrect but so plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous,
unreasonable or without foundation.

Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106 Idaho 905, 911, 684 P.2d 307, 313 (Ct. App. 1984),
overruled on other grounds by NBC Leasing Co. v. R&T Farms, 112 Idaho 500, 733 P.2d 721
(1987). See also, Gibson v. Bennett, 141 Idaho 270, 277, 108 P.3d 417, 424 (Ct. App. 2005)
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(“Although we were not persuaded by Gibson’s arguments, applying the standard enunciated for
I.C. §12-121, we decline to award attorney fees in this case”); Tolley v. THI Co.,140 Idaho 253,
263, 92 P.3d 503, 513 (affirming district court’s holding that “[a] suit is not frivolous or groundless
simply because the case is determined on summary judgment”); C&G v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 769,
25 P.3d 76, 82 (2001) (“Although the Court disagrees with Galvin’s arguments regarding the
construction of the deeds, we do not find that the action was brought frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation”); Lowery v. Board of County Comm’rs, 115 Idaho 64, 69, 764 P.2d 431, 436
(Ct. App. 1988) (“A defense is not frivolous or groundless merely because the respondent loses”);
Gulf Chem. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho 890, 895, 693 P.2d 1092, 1097
(Ct. App. 1984) (“when a fairly debatable claim is deemed frivolous for no stated reason other
than its ultimate failure upon a point of law, we believe discretion has been abused”).
Thus, “when a party pursues an action which contains fairly debatable issues, the action is
not considered to be frivolous and without foundation.” C&G, 135 Idaho at 769, 25 P.3d at 82.
See also, McCann, 152 Idaho at 823, 275 P.3d at 838 (“Attorney fees under I.C. §12-121 are not
warranted where a novel legal question is presented”); Idaho Military Historical Soc’y, Inc. v.
Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 630, 329 P.3d 1072, 1078 (2014) (“Attorney fees will not be awarded for
arguments that are based on a good faith legal argument”); Gibson, 141 Idaho at 277, 108 P.3d at
424 (“Legal arguments that are supported by a good faith argument for the extension or
modification of the law in Idaho are not so plainly fallacious to be deemed frivolous”); Lanham v.
Fleenor, 429 P.3d 1231, 1241 (Idaho 2018) (award of attorney fees is not appropriate where “[t]he
core issue turns on an unsettled question of law”).
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b.

BrunoBuilt Made "Good Faith Arguments" As To Each Issue
Appealed

BrunoBuilt's arguments were not "plainly fallacious" but, m fact, presented "fairly
debatable" issues.
i.

Settlement Agreement

The parties' disputed settlement negotiations are well-documented and will not be repeated
here. Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 13-24. In short, it was and remains BrunoBuilt's position that
no enforceable settlement agreement was ever reached. The fact that the district court concluded
otherwise does not render Bruno Built' s position frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
It is worth reiterating that the sole consideration offered by Strata for the settlement
agreement was a covenant not to sue executed by the Rowans in the Sericati case. In this regard,
BrunoBuilt required "something in writing signed by the Rowans" before it would dismiss its
claims against Strata in Kleinfelder. R. 700. On January 12, 2017, the parties in the Sericati action
executed a Confidential Release of All Claims & Indemnity Agreement that included a covenant
not to sue executed by Paul and Becky Rowan. R. 52, i-f9. This is the same covenant not to sue that
Strata offered as consideration to settle with BrunoBuilt. But Strata acknowledges that it did not
have authority to "tender" the covenant not to sue to BrunoBuilt: "the Sericati release agreement
in which the Rowan covenant not to sue is contained is subject to a comprehensive confidentiality
clause, requiring specific consent from all parties to the release agreement before it could be
disclosed to BrunoBuilt." R. 737. Under such circumstances, BrunoBuilt's reluctance to proceed
toward settlement can hardly be described as frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
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ii.

Economic Loss Rule

“Unless an exception applies, the economic loss rule prohibits recovery of purely economic
losses in a negligence action because there is no duty to prevent economic loss to another.” Path
to Help, LLP v. Long, 161 Idaho 50, 56, 383 P.3d 1220, 1226 (2016). Non-recoverable economic
loss includes costs of repair and replacement of defective property that is the subject of the
transaction, as well as commercial loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use.
Id., at 64. But economic losses are recoverable in negligence cases where there is damage to
property that is not the subject of the transaction or the plaintiff suffers the complete loss or
destruction of its property.
BrunoBuilt argues that the economic loss rule does not bar its claims against Strata because
the BrunoBuilt dwelling is a complete loss and the dwelling is property that is not the subject of
the transaction. The basis for this argument is, in part, that Strata performed engineering services
for the vacant lot before BrunoBuilt constructed the dwelling, but Strata performed no engineering
services for the dwelling itself. The district court likened the present case to cases where the
plaintiffs purchased a lot with existing improvements as an integrated whole, and on that basis
concluded that this is a “defective property” case subject to the economic loss rule. This issue is
“fairly debatable,” however, and BrunoBuilt presented a “good faith argument” to support its
position. Accordingly, BrunoBuilt’s position is not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
It is evident from the foregoing that BrunoBuilt did not pursue this appeal frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation. Consequently, Strata’s request for attorney fees pursuant to
I.C. §12-121 should be denied.
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F.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in Appellant's Opening Brief, BrunoBuilt requests that

the Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement or,
Alternatively, for Summary Judgment and Motion for Relief Under 56(d) filed on July 11, 2018
and the Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Reconsider filed on November 6, 2018 be
reversed, that the Judgment filed on January 10, 2019 be vacated, and that the matter be remanded
to the district court for further proceedings.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of September 2019.
MCCONNELL WAGNER SYKES

BY:

& STACEY PLLC

Isl Rick L. Stacey
Rick L. Stacey
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
BrunoBuilt, Inc.
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